The idea of God in Early Religions.

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A scientific investigation of the origin of the more abstract concepts of the human mind is handicapped by an initial difficulty respecting the nature of the evidence bearing on the problem. Time-order as such has no necessary connexion with any order of development, for in time there may be retrogression as well as progress, degeneration as well as advance. It is only an evolutionary habit of thought that makes us construe different civilizations as stages in a progression of which our civilization is the apex, and the culture of such a people as the Australian aborigines is the base. As a matter of fact the native tribes of Australia, like all other modern races living under more or less primitive conditions, have a history behind them extending over much the same length of time as that of our own, and they can only be regarded as primitive in the sense that their long period of isolation has enabled them to retain many of their original customs and beliefs which at one time they held in common with the rest of mankind, before the experience of the ages, and contact with new ideas, raised the more developed people from a prehistoric state of culture. In this period of seclusion, however, they have been liable to degeneration, and as Rivers has shown, useful arts like the canoe, bow and arrow and the making of pottery, have disappeared in Oceania¹, to say nothing of religious rites and beliefs. Nevertheless, where material culture has undergone very little if any important changes, it may be assumed, at any rate for purposes of illustration, that the characteristic features of the mentality of the people have not altered to an appreciable extent. Thus, the universal occurrence of the idea of God among modern primitive people suggests a probability in favour of this concept being a part of the original sub-stratum of religious consciousness.

We know that to-day primitive people regard unfamiliar objects and events as supernatural — a peculiar mountain, rock or tree, a bubbling stream, an unusual animal or a strange herb, — are often looked upon as sacred and therefor tabu. Thus Marett has been led to postulate a preanimistic or animatistic phase at the threshold of religion manifesting itself on the emotional side when ideation was vague, as an attitude of mind dictated by awe of the mysterious². This he connects with the mystic impersonal force called by the Melanesians Mana, which “works to effect everything which lie beyond the power of men, outside the common process of nature”³. Actually, however, mana is only impersonal in the Banks and Torres islands, it being “out and out spiritualistic” elsewhere in the Pacific ⁴. But apart from the precise significance of mana, and its American counterpart Orenda⁵, it seems that at a very early period there arose probably a conception of universal power, which had many uses and manifestations. The Aurignacians at the beginning

² Threshold of Religion (Lond. 1914), p. 3 ff.
⁴ Hocart, Man, 1914, p. 46.
of the Upper Palaeolithic, for example, apparently attributed life-giving functions to female figures with the maternal organs grossly exaggerated, and possibly to certain shells. Blood, again, was regarded as a vitalizing agent, and it was no doubt a similar belief that lay behind the dramatic rites which appear to have been performed in some of the Palaeolithic caves e.g. Tuc d'Audoubert and Trois Frères in Ariège, where ritual dances seem to have been performed to control the chase and get supernatural strength to enable man to go on life's pilgrimage with hope and confidence. These rites may have been the expression of a notion not far removed from the modern philosophical and psychological concept of an élan vital or libido finding an outlet in fresh experiment and creative evolution, and the scientific theory of potential and kinetic energy as the ultimate constitution of matter.

It is easy to see how the idea of supernatural energy manifesting itself in various forms of "activity", may be associated with a belief in Deity. As the lightning shivered the trees, and the thunder crashed amid torrential rains, early man doubtless felt himself in the presence of a transcendent Something that he did not understand and certainly could not control. In this way probably he became aware of a "not himself" that is alive. Overcome emotionally by the awesomeness of nature, as his sense of wonder deepened, spontaneously he underwent a religious experience of the most exalted kind, not unlike that of the Psalmist to whom the thunderstorm that passed over the country was a revelation of God. He had been thrilled by the storm, and in his exalted state of feeling, his emotions became religious, and he heard God's voice (Ps. XXIX). It was probably much the same with early man.

If we are correct in this surmise, the idea of God in the last analysis is reduced to a spontaneous awareness of an awful non — rational power — the Deity as apprehended in what Otto would call the numinous experience of wonder. Man did not, as it seems to us, invent the idea of God or make Him in his own image, as is frequently assumed, rather he became conscious of the concept, ascribing personality to the living Reality behind and within the universe in proportion to his own self-consciousness. The ego instinct doubtless existed from the beginning, but man did not at once recognize his own identity. At an early period (i.e. not later than the Aurignacian culture phase) the sex instinct found a magico-religious expression in the Mother-cult, and the desire for self-preservation sought an outlet in the belief in a continuance of life after death, as is evidenced by the Mousterian and subsequent ceremonial interments. Again, as Durkheim has shown, with perhaps too much emphasis, one of the primary objects of religious veneration was the society of which the individual was a member, a society or church possessing all the properties necessary to arouse in its members the realization of the divine. Thus religion has been also the handmaid of the herd-instinct since man seldom

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* L'Anthrop. XXIII, 1912, p. 129 ff.
finds God by himself, but as a member of the sacred community. But at length, by a long process of conceptual and socialized thinking, he did come to a knowledge of his own individuality, and as Webb has said, "the more definite ascription of personality to the object of Religion will generally correspond to a fuller realization of his own personality by the worshipper".  

At first the social group depended upon the supernatural power or mystic force behind the world of Nature in which it participated. But does it therefore follow, as the French anthropologists of the school of Levy-Bruhl and Durkheim suppose, that the primitive mind is incapable of distinguishing between one entity and another? According to this hypothesis, a man believes that he is both a man and an animal, the symbiosis being strengthened by the performance of dramatic rites in which he frequently disguises himself as the animal species by a mark or other symbol, and represents its gestures. In other words, primitive thinking is governed by the "law of participation" so that objects are not divided from one another but appear as "collective representations" united in a bond so intimate that each participates in the other, making it what it is not. The thinking of modern man, on the other hand, is dominated by the "law of contradiction" — that nothing can be at once A and also B which is other than A. On this hypothesis, the notion of personality and individuality was impossible so long as man remained in a so called state of "pre-logical mentality", knowing not the "law of contradiction".

Primitive man may identify things which to us seem mutually exclusive, and assert essential connexions between things which we regard as having nothing to do with each other, but only because his premises, not his logic, are at fault. He accepts the social tradition imposed upon him from his earliest days and acts accordingly. Having no conception of the universality and continuity of natural causation, he attributes every event which arrests his attention, or demands an explanation, to supernatural agencies. Cause and effect and agent and act are not clearly differentiated, not from lack of logic but from an imperfect understanding of natural laws and processes. And this, we venture to think, applies equally to the beginnings of human mentality.

The Tylorian theory of animism as a belief in spiritual beings, cannot now be regarded as a "minimum definition of religion" because the concept of "spirits" in the wide sense that includes "souls", implies a realization of personality comparable to that of a quasi-human being, which was probably quite beyond the range of early thought. At the earliest level of religious experience, the numinous consciousness was apparently but an inchoate stirring of the feelings — a stimulus independent either of logic or theology. The whole universe belonged to one great system of interrelated and inherent life, the unconscious expression of the religious emotion itself. But as the individual object became associated with this emotion, the experience was rationalised and interpreted in terms of entities, till at last the representations or rationalizations of religion took over an individuality of their own.

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12 C. C. J. WEBB, God and Personality (Lond. 1918), p. 248.
It was probably at this stage in the process that the beliefs comprised by the term animism arose, as an external embodiment of an inherent power and vitality with a distinct body or form of its own. Thus in North America, the Iroquois of the Eastern States suppose that in every object there is an inherent power called orenda, analogous to will and intelligence — the counterpart of the Melanesian mana — concept. On the Plains to the West, the Omaha address prayers and ascribe certain anthropomorphic attributes to a kind of vital essence called wakonda, "the power that moves." Here the impersonal energy is on its way to becoming a separate spiritual being with a cult of its own, while to the north this has been definitely accomplished among the Eastern Algonquians who apply the term manitu to any spirit or genius loci, although these spirits are not infrequently thought to assume the shape of the object. An arrow, for example, is manitu because a spirit has either transformed itself into the arrow, or dwells in it.

Similarly with animistic conception of the soul. The notion of a vital principle in the body was elaborated in Egypt into the doctrine of the ka or guardian genius, which was born with the man, and resided in his body during life except when he went on a journey in sleep. In addition to the ka, personality consisted of the visible body and the invisible intelligence (khu) situated in the heart (ab) or abdomen. The breath as distinct from the intelligence was the actual vital essence, and after the Xllth Dynasty, the two were symbolised by the ba, or human-headed bird hovering over the mummy, extending to its nostrils in the one hand the figure of a swelling sail, the hieroglyph for wind or breath, and, in the other, the crux ansata, or symbol of life.

The practice of mummmification, of course, developed around this belief as an attempt to ensure the physical restoration of the dead by the reconstruction of the personality severed a death. But the technical difficulties in the way of making the mummy the simulacrum of the deceased were so great that, notwithstanding the measure of success achieved in the Pyramid Age, and especially in the XVIIIth to XXIst Dynasties, the practice was never wholly successful, and the custom of making images of the dead in stone and wood to receive the ka was adopted side by side with that of the mummmification of the mortal remains. These statues were regarded as the man himself, and not merely as the abode of his life. The ceremony of the animation of a portrait statue was looked upon, in fact, as a creative act, the sculptor being designated, "he who makes to live." The transference of the life of a man to his image must have tended to magnify the importance of the vital principle at the expense of the body, thereby paving the way, as it seems to us, for the animistic notion of the soul as a separate entity dwelling in, but separable from the body, and capable of carrying on the life of the individual either in the disembodied state, or in another body distinct from the mortal remains.

Dreams and reflections in water may have played some part in this deve-

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18 Hewitt, op. cit.
21 Breasted, Development of Religion and Thought in Ancient Egypt. (Lond. 1912).
lopment, but, we venture to suggest, the doctrine of animism is essentially an extension and elaboration of an inherent vital principle as man because conscious of the several parts of his own being. In this case, it represents a comparatively late stage in human speculation. Just as it is only as a baby gains control over its limbs that it learns to regard them as part of itself, so doubtless man came to recognize his own personality by his ability to regulate the movements of his own members. Similarly the motion of natural phenomena, such as animals, plants, trees, the heavenly bodies, water, would lead to the notion of life and personality being ascribed to them also, and as the concept of the human soul developed, together with the other attributes of man, these “animate” objects too came to be regarded as “living beings”, and independent entities with their own soul, and sometimes their own vitalizing powers.

But an animate object having a personal or life-giving signification is not necessarily a “spirit” still less a god. Before it can be raised to the Divine order, it has to become associated with the religious emotion. The real difference of attitude towards the natural and the supernatural, the impersonal and personal, depends upon the profounder side of the ‘self’ of the individual. In these matters we are all, savage and civilized alike, controlled by emotion much more than by cold reasonings, for the gulf we fix between the sacred and the secular, the holy and the profane, the common and the religious, depends essentially on the impression made by the phenomena upon our numinous consciousness. With a fuller knowledge of personality, and the conception of the Self in the universe, the supernatural necessarily becomes “personalized” by degrees. Thus in a totemic community, the members of each group are linked together by a sacred ally, but as they get to know themselves, the individual totem emerges as a sort of guardian genius or guiding spirit of the individual rather than of the whole group. Among the Omaha, for instance, an animal is assigned to every man at puberty as a guardian spirit, and so close is the bond between them, that the man is supposed to acquire the qualities of the creature, while the whole conception of n a g u a l i s m, or the selection of an animal as the tutelary deity of a child so that the life of the one depends on that of the other, is an illustration of this stage in the growth of personality 20.

Having arrived at an interpretation of the universe in terms of personality, according to Frazer man thereby peopled it with a multitude of individual spirits in “every rock” and hill, every tree and flower, every brook and river, every breeze that blew, and every cloud that flecked with silvery white the blue expanse of heaven” 21. From this spiritualistic theory of natural phenomena polytheism is supposed to have arisen by the limitation of the number of the indwelling spirits to a pantheon of deities believed to control the various departments of nature. In place of a separate spirit for every individual tree, man came to conceive of a god of the woods in general, a Silvanus or what not; instead of personifying all the winds as gods, he imagined a single god, an Aeolus, for example, who kept them shut in a bag, and could let them out at pleasure to lash the sea into fury. By the same

20 Cf. E. O. JAMES in Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics, XII, p. 489 f.
process of abstraction and generalization, the same desire for simplification and
unification by which, polytheism evolved out of animism, the many gods were
deposed in favour of one, and polytheism passed into monotheism 22.

Like others of his theories, this hypothesis is very simply stated, but does it really explain the facts? Is theism a derivative of animism, or are the two beliefs
collateral developments? A fundamental distinction between gods and spirits is that
while both are personal, gods alone have a real individuality. Moreover, man never
seems to have been content to regard the Deity merely as an animating principle, or
a spiritual being immanent in Nature. As soon as he became conscious of his own
personality, he ascribed to his god a personality in the highest degree of which
his mind was capable of conceiving it. Even Buddhism, starting with a depreciation
of personality, has only survived as another form personal theism, while Roman
cult, with its unorganized system of Numina or shadow-deities, contributed little or
nothing to religious thought. In all the great theistic faiths, Hellenic, Judaic, Zara-
thussian, Christian and Islamic, the personality of God becomes most complex
and a focus of Divine attributes. Since these ideas of personality correspond to a
fuller realization of his own personality by the worshipper, all personal theism is
in a sense anthropomorphic. But however much at this stage of mental development
man was inclined to make his god in his own image, the fundamental postulate was
that of a living Reality behind the universe, a transcendent Something that he
could not explain, a "not himself" that is alive. It was only when he began to
think in terms of personality that he expressed Deity in intellectual concepts both
rational and anthropomorphic.

Since in all ages the predominating tendency seems to have been for man to find
a source of strength in something psychically superior to himself, be it amulet,
image, totem, spirit or god, it is hardly surprising that ancestral chiefs and heroes
should often have been elevated to the supernatural order. In Egypt the king stood
in the closest relationship with the Divine realm, being regarded as the physical
son of the Sun-god, Re, from the V th Dynasty onwards 23. Osiris also seems to
have been a civilising king who in process of time became deified 24. Thus both he
and Re were connected with the kingship, the one perhaps being the deified ancestral
monarch, the other the progenitor of the reigning house. This would account for
pharaoh being called unhesitatingly Osiris and Re in the same passage in the later
texts 25. In Babylonia the Sumerian city-kings claimed to have been begotten by
the gods and born of goddesses although they were not actually deified 26, while
in Greece the Homeric king was descended from gods (Διόνυσωτές), and super-
natural powers were assigned to him 27. The Japanese standard reminds us that
the emperor is a descendant of the Sun and was a god 28, just as the Natchez in

23 BREASTED, op. cit., p. 15.
24 Golden Bough Pt. IV (Adonis &c), II, p. 198. ELLIOT SMITH, Evolution of
the Dragon, p. 29 ff. PETRIE, Religion of Ancient Egypt (Lond. 1906), p. 38 f.
25 BREASTED, p. 160.
Luisiana called their chief the Great Sun and looked upon him as the offspring and human representative of the Sun 28.

It would seem, then, that the divinity of kings was intimately connected, with the early development of theism. If Osiris was the first king of Egypt, and if the Dynastic period in the Nile valley predated the rise of other monarchies, Elliot Smith may be right in seeing in him a prototype of the gods who began life as chiefs, kings or popular heroes 29. But these divinities were not immortal. They grew old and died. Consequently it was necessary for their corruptible bodies to put on incorruption through the process of mumification in Egypt, which explains the fact that every province had a mummy of its dead god. Likewise in Crete, the grave of Zeus was shown to visitors as late as the beginning of the Christian era, while the corpse of Dionysus was buried at Delphi beside the golden statue of Apollo, Cronus was interred in Sicily, Hermes in Hermopolis, Aphrodite in Cyprus and Ares in Thrace 31. It was this belief in the mortality of gods that led to the practice of killing the king, as the divine representative, when he showed signs of growing old and feeble, and to the offering of rejuvenating sacrifices to keep them in vigour.

It seems probable that the divine king was regarded as the source of vitality as a result of the identification of the chief with the Sun whose fertilizing rays gave both light and life to the earth. But did the notion of an external Creator originate in the theology of Osiris and Re? The gods associated with creation in Egyptian mythology are many. Thus the genesis of the Sun is variously attributed to Seb and Nuit, the 1st. Dynasty sky-goddess who produced the earth, and gave the king the name of “Son of Nuit”. This prepared the way for the assimilation of the king to Re and Osiris according as these successive theologies connected the deities with Nuit. The Sun-god therefore was not the first sky deity to be assigned creative functions even in Egypt, and the conception of an external Supreme Creator is probably independent in origin of that of the divine culture-hero, as typified perhaps by Osiris. The two cults may have been fused by the king being regarded as either an incarnation or the son of the Creator. Thus among the Shilluk, behind the figure of the semi-divine hero, Nyakang, the equivalent of Osiris, there stands the shadowy form of the High God Juok, and although his worship has been eclipsed by that of the divine king and ancestor, yet he remains the Creator and Supreme God 32.

This is typical of the All-Father belief among primitive people. Beside the culture-hero there is the Creator, beneficent and ethical, who dwells in the heavens in dignified seclusion from the affairs of man. The Uitoto of Columbia, for example, in addition to the deified ancestors, recognise Nainema, “He-who-is-appearance only”, as the Creator 33, while among the Dakota in North America the Supreme Deity is comprehended as Wakan Tanka, the Great Mystery, made up of four

29 ELLIOT SMITH, op. cit., p. 29 f.
31 SELIGMAN, Cult of Nyakang and the Divine Kings of the Shilluk (Khartoum 1911), p. 216 ff.
32 PREUMS, Rel. und Mythologie der Uitoto, I, p. 166 f.
eternal essences to be regarded as one — the Chief God, the Great Spirit; the Creator, and the Executive. In Australia the All-Fathers seem to be a combination of deified culture-heroes and beneficent Creators, since they are usually regarded as highly ethical gods who had their abode on earth like Osiris, and retired to their present abode in the sky, whence they sent down “everything that the blackfellow has”. Therefore primitive monotheism is apparently a dual concept, one aspect of which is based on a custom which may be traced as far back as early Egypt and Greece — the custom of worshipping kings in their own name — the other, the notion of the beneficent Creator, going back to a much earlier period of religious development, and representing the climax of an emotional awareness of something other than oneself.

The All-Father belief is certainly not the product of philosophical thinking, nor the triumph of the unifying principle over the disruptive, of abstract over concrete thought. It is the functioning of an emotion rather than the elaboration of a certain kind of knowledge about the universe. Hence the recurrence of monotheism in all states of culture, and in every age of religious development. Moreover the concept of the benevolent Creator would seem to represent the climax of religious thought and inspiration at any given stage, since although primitive people seldom have any relations with the All-Father, they attach to him a value superior to that of other supernatural beings, representing, in fact, the apprehension of the Divine in the highest sense possible for the human mind at any given stage.

This belief arose spontaneously is suggested by the fact that when man did begin to speculate about the universe in later times, he was invariably led to find a solution to his theological questionings in polytheism. Spirits and totems became individualized as gods, heroes were raised to divine rank as ancestral and tribal deities, and natural phenomena deified, as in the Vedic cult where Varuna is the god of the open sky, Indra is the upper air, Ushas the dawn. Polytheism may have evolved out of animism in many cases, as Frazer suggests, but there is no reason to think that this was by any means the only source from which the Pantheon was devided, or that monotheism resulted from it by a process of abstraction and generalisation. On the contrary, the multiplication of departmental deities tended to obscure the High God, till at length he disappeared unless he became amalgamated with the lesser gods, or if he survived he degenerated into a bohey to frighten women and children, as among the Central tribes of Australia.

In Babylonia, where the Pantheon was composed chiefly of the divinities of individual cities, when Babylon was made the capital, its god Marduk absorbed the attributes of all the other gods, just as when Uru, in an earlier period, became supreme, its Moon-god Sin was the chief god of the land. But no attempt was made

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36 Spencer and Gillen, Northern Tribes of Central Australia (London 1904), p. 338.
to establish Marduk or his predecessors as the only god in Babylonia, and the powerful personality of Ishtar, the Mother-goddess, would alone have made monotheism impossible in the Euphrates valley. Furthermore, the people were unable to regard each and every Babylonian god as the highest deity without conflicting with the claims of any other god. Neither Marduk nor the Assyrian Asur, represents a deity as the Creator, the Lord of Nature as a whole, the controller of the entire universe and of human history. Each was, in other words, one god among many, and when one rose to supremacy his reign was always liable to be cut short by a military or political reverse, or the claims of his rivals.

Thus the remarkable triumph of solar monotheism in Egypt in the XVIII th. Dynasty, when Ikhnaton (Amenhotep IV) made the Sun-god, Aton, the beneficent Creator of all things “beside whom there is no other,” was swept away after the death of Amenhotep, not merely because polytheism had a greater hold on the popular mind, but because the Aton was actually a nature god. Being a syncretistic deity with human and beneficent aspects, he lacked direct ethical characterization, and had all the weaknesses of a nature-power. True the beauty of the eternal and universal light was identified with love as the visible evidence of the presence of the deity who is the author of the beneficence of the natural order, but as the growth of magic persisted, especially in connexion with the cult of the dead, his ethical attributes declined and were lost in the tangle of polytheistic cults.

Among the Greeks, although a few passages in the Homeric literature seem to assert the principle of monotheism, as, for example, the use of Ἵβος in the abstract as the equivalent of Zeus, they apparently represent the expression of religious emotion associated elsewhere with the All-Father belief, rather than a general trend towards the worship of one God, as this doctrine never affected the popular religion. While from Homer downwards, Zeus undoubtedly retained the supremacy of the Olympian Pantheon, even Apollo speaking at Delphi only as his mouthpiece, and Athena being unable to avert the destruction of Athens by the Persians because it was his will, yet the popular mind could not live up even to these henotheistic heights, leave alone to the later metaphysical conceptions of Deity and the Aristotelian notion of the Unmoved Mover which dominated Stoic thought. It resorted therefore to the legends of the minor divinities and polytheistic mythology for the solution of its theological problems, though the more enlightened minds probably knew that these naïve assertions were not true. Similarly, even in Israel, where ethical monotheism prevailed as in no other ancient civilization, the Hebrew seers and prophets continually lamented the falling away of the people to the attractive polytheistic cults of the surrounding nations.

It seems, therefore, that once man had come to believe in gods, polytheism fitted in with the primitive conception of the universe much better than monotheism. So long as cause and effect were not clearly differentiated, any extraordinary event was attributed to supernatural beings, but in the 6 th. century B. C., when the

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39 II, XIII, 730; Od. IV, 236.
40 Cf. FARNELL, The Cult of the Greek States (Oxford 1896), 1, p. 84 ff.

Anthropos XXII. 1927.
Greek philosophers began to study nature with the avowed object of investigating its laws and imitating them, inexplicable incidents gradually came to be regarded as dependant on natural causes rather than on departmental deities. The problem of being then took the place of the intervention of the gods, and the whole basis of polytheism was undermined. Socrates inferred from the presence of design in the world that a benevolent Creator existed behind the universe, to whom alone the term God is applicable, and earlier Xenophanes declared that God is one, uncreated, righteous, and without resemblance to man, though, as in the case of Heraclitus, he conceived the Deity as wholly immanent in the universe. But these philosophical reasonings about God and the universe are a very different intellectual process from that which found expression in the earlier developments of primitive monotheism.

The belief in Supreme Beings, in short, represents a psychological tendency rather than a stage in an evolutionary system; it is the climax of primitive religious thought, the emotional response to, and evaluation of, the mystrium tremendum, and not the elaboration of a quasi-scientific knowledge of the universe. The swinging of a bull-roarer, which makes a noise like that of thunder, doubtless aroused these emotions, though it is not the least likely that this instrument represents the prototype of the idea of God as Maret suggests, any more than that a cowrie shell was the first deity that the wit of man devised, as Elliot Smith would have us believe. The Deity concept, as it seems to us, originated in an intuitive realization of a Power, awful and mysterious, behind the visible order, controlling its processes and manifesting itself in extraordinary events and uncanny objects. Gradually the whole supernatural world of faith emerged, as the concept became intellectualized and evaluated, till at length a new method of reasoning dawned as part of an evolutionary process from which the original emotion stood apart, being a different attitude of mind.

As Radin has recently shown, in every community there are always a few people to whom religion makes a ready appeal, but in the case of the majority it is only at certain times—at crises such as birth, marriage, death, harvest, etc.—that the religious emotion is aroused to any appreciable extent. To the intermittently and indifferently religious ethical monotheism seldom makes an appeal, and therefore it is the lesser deities, spirits, totems, or ancestors that men of this type usually approach. The High God thus tends to become remote unless he is brought into relation with a popular culture-hero or spirit. This doubtless explains why monotheism invariably gave place to polytheism in the religions of antiquity. Nevertheless, the recurrence of monotheistic notions in Babylonia and Egypt, to say nothing of savage Supreme Beings, and the ease with which primitive people identify the Christian idea of God with their own, indicate that this aspect of theism is an innate disposition rather than a later product of evolution.

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