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Savage Thought and Thoughtful Savages
167
would have to be ascribed to vengeance and not
to witchcraft (5-7). Unlike himself, the Azande
would not notice this contradiction as they do not
consider the overall effect of all ritualistic acts
and do not conduct magic in public. Thus every
family perceives only a singular chain of action
consisting of a “death caused by witchcraft” -
oracle-vengeful magic - “death of the responsible
witch.” No effort is taken to figure out how these
activities fit into the sum of actions in society
(202). Evans-Pritchard admitted that the nobility
has this general view and solves the problem by
claiming that vengeful magic is not allowed if
the deceased himself was killed because he was
a witch. However, Evans-Pritchard held that his
informant on this topic, a prince, had lied to him.
Vengeful magic would be carried out in secret.
Every family pretends that they enact vengeful
magic to avoid the notion that the deceased fam
ily member was a witch who was justly killed.
Therefore, Evans-Pritchard claimed that he could
not verify the statement of the prince (7).
Evans-Pritchard’s central statement about the
magical beliefs of the Azande is his claim that
they are coherent and consistent in spite of their
mystical foundation and their lack of physical
knowledge. Thus, if the oracle contradicts itself,
this contradiction is not ignored but explained
using additional hypotheses like the assumption
that the oracle’s poison had been bewitched (155
-159, 203). Evans-Pritchard claimed that it posed
no problem for him as a European man to un
derstand and empathize with the belief system of
the Azande, as this system is coherently developed
from the basic assumption that witchcraft exists
and is responsible for human misfortune (45).
Cotext and Context - Who in Europe is
Addressed by Evans-Pritchard?
Evans-Pritchard quotes Lévy-Bruhl as the author
who stimulated his research on magic and witch
craft among the Azande the most (Evans-Pritchard
1976: 241). The importance which Evans-Pritchard
attributes to Lévy-Bruhl’s work is documented
in Evans-Pritchard’s book “Theories of Primi
tive Religion” (1965). It is only Lévy-Bruhl
to whom Evans-Pritchard dedicates a complete
chapter, while the discussion of the theses of
Tylor or Durkheim is confined to a few pages
(Evans-Pritchard 1965: 78-99). The preeminent
role which Evans-Pritchard ascribes to Lévy-Bruhl
is explicated by Lévy-Bruhl’s insistence on the
difference between occidental-rational and primi
tive, “mystical” modes of thought. A discussion
of Lévy-Bruhl’s theses will clarify why Evans-
Pritchard reacted highly ambivalently to Lévy-
Bruhl’s basic assumptions.
Lévy-Bruhl promoted Durkheim’s thesis that
social facts cannot be explained by the individ
ual’s psyche. Like in the case of language, social
facts precede the individual. Lévy-Bruhl claimed
that the “collective representations” of “primitive
men” are such preceding conditions (Lévy-Bruhl
1985: 13). Collective representations are supposed
to be the ideas that primitives have of the objects
of their world. These ideas are something like
visual images of objects which are inseparably
fused with the “emotions and passions” they evoke
in the “primitive” mind. Occidental concepts, on
the other hand, would only display some abstract
connection to the object of experience. While our
perception is centered on the “objective reality,
and this reality alone,” which can be experienced
by our senses, the main interest of “primitives”
would be centered on the secret power or “mystic”
elements of an object (Lévy-Bruhl 1985: 36-38,
59). However, “primitive” mentality would not on
ly use mystical collective representations where we
apply rational concepts, but would link these rep
resentations in a fundamentally different way than
Europeans do, who supposedly connect their con
cepts by logical conclusions and reasoning. The
collective representations which contain mystical
power would directly affect each other by means
of an alleged “mystical” connection between them.
As primitive men believe that everything possesses
a mystical power, this power is supposed to induce
a widespread array of effects without being con
fined to the observable realm of physical causation.
This mystical effect of one object on another thing
was called “participation” by Lévy-Bruhl. This
participation may work by direct contact, trans
mission, sympathy, or remote effects and explains
why a native American tribe may postulate that
they are “red araras” (parrots). Lévy-Bruhl claimed
that this belief is a logical contradiction, because
a native American cannot be a human being and
an arara at the same time. However, the natives
feel a “mystical identity” with the araras. Thus,
their self-representations participate in those of the
araras because of some mystical connection. As
this participation contradicts our logic, Lévy-Bruhl
called their mode of thought “prelogical” (1985: 76
-78).
The fascinating aspect of Lévy-Bruhl’s theory
is that he considered “primitive mentality” as an
autonomous system that works with different el
ements and connections than those used by our